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Abstract
In an economy where entrepreneurs with unequal
"abilities" face alternative investment projects, which
differ in degree of risk and productivity, we analyse the
Nash equilibrium contracts arising from a banks-borrowers
game in the context of asymmetric information. We show that,
for a particular characterization of the game, one can
determine the endogenous distribution of projects and the
"type" of contracts (pooling or separating) as functions of
the amount of loanable funds. We set this game in a general
equilibrium aggregative economy with production, populated by
overlapping generations of borrowers and lenders and show
that for a range of the parameter values equilibria are
characterized by persistent endogenous cycles.
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1
Many economists have argued that in economies with imperfect financial markets business
cycle fluctuations are likely to be amplified. In particular, when lenders are not well informed
about borrowers’ investment projects, they tend to devise “second-best” contracts that may
induce the borrowers to reveal some information. Typically, these contracts entail collateral
requirements and credit rationing. As a consequence, real investment and consumption
become highly dependent on the borrowers’ balance sheet position, i.e., on the value of his
net assets.
Various authors, including Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993)
and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), ,have noticed that the equilibrium quantity of lending and the
default rates resulting from these second-best contracts may be highly sensitive to exogenous
shocks. Thus the amplitude of the cycles is far greater than it would be with perfect financial
markets andthe effects of a shock to one sector may be more easily propagated to other
sectors.
In general , this literature has focused on the role of imperfect financial markets in am-
plifying the propagation and the variability of the business cycle, assuming that the latter
isoriginated by exogenous disturbances.
In this paper we set up a model in which informational asymmetries and second-best
contracts in financial markets
originate from any exogenous
Our approach is different
may be responsible for business cycle fluctuations that do not
disturbance.
from that of the authors cited above, in whose models the
main sources of business cycle fluctuations are borrowing limits, agency costs or collateral
requirements. Instead, in our model a major role is played by the cyclical variability of the
distribution of investment projects.
In our model entrepreneurs face different technologies to produce a single capital good
lP. Reichlin acknowledges support from the HCM Program of the European Commission, contract
CHRXCT94-0458.  P. Siconolfi acknowledges the financial support of the GSB of Columbia University.
We thank Gianni De Nicolò for many helpful conversations.and financial intermediaries are unable to observe both the borrowers’ investment projects
and their ability.
To simplify the analysis we assume the existence of only two types of investment projects,
“good” and “bad”, where the latter are dominated both in terms of risk and social productiv-
ity. The two projects have the same expected gross return, but the bad one is characterized
by a lower probability of success (it is riskier) and it can only be operated by paying a fixed
cost. As a result, the higher the proportion X of agents undertaking the bad project, the
higher is the loss of efficiency and real resources characterizing  the associated equilibria.
Under some conditions, the equilibrium contracts allow for the existence of both types of
project and their distribution is a function of the amount of loanable funds. In particular,
loanable funds and bad projects are, at least in a critical region, positively correlated.
In our model, there is a sort of “cleansing effect of recessions”, a phenomenon documented
by Caballero and Hammour (1994)in a different context. During the cyclical upswing (when
there is a large amount of loanable funds) competitive lenders devise contracts attracting
a high proportion of bad projects; conversely, the opposite occurs during the downswing.
The decline in the average quality of projects during the upswing, in turn, implies a loss of
aggregate resources that may eventually lead to a recession.
The basic reason why cycles may be persistent in our model is that we find the existence
of a fundamental discontinuity in the relation between loanable funds and the proportion of
bad projects. This discontinuity is a consequence of a change in the characteristics of the
second-best contracts that can emerge in financial markets and it may prevent the dynamics
of the model from settling down to a stationary state.
In our model second-best contracts emerge in equilibrium since the relation between
banks and firms is affected by moral hazard and adverse selection. In fact, the borrowers
prepared to pay a higher interest rate are those who choose the riskier projects and this
choice is affected by a costly action (where the cost of the action differs across borrowers).
To understand the banks-borrowers model, it may be useful to compare it to the Roth-
schild and Stiglitz (1976)insurance game (RS).There,the distribution of borrowers (insured)
8is exogenous and thus there is no moral hazard problem. In the RS model, Nash equilibrium
contracts can only be separating and they exist only for a “large” proportion of high risk
agents.As noted by Hellwig (1987), )these two features of the model are a consequence of
assuming that the game has two stages.
Following Hellwig (1987))we choose a three stage game: lenders move first by offering
loan contracts, borrowers apply for one of these contracts at the second stage and lenders
accept or reject their applications at the last stage.
We define a “credit market equilibrium” as the set of Nash equilibrium contracts that
satisfies the market-clearing conditions in the financial market. We prove that Nash equilibria
always exist, that equilibrium contracts can be pooling and/or separating and that at a Nash
equilibrium financial markets always clear.
Separating contracts can only be compatible with a Nash equilibrium when the interest
rates are sufficiently high. Low rates induce a high proportion of borrowers to choose the safer
projects and, as we know from the RS model, this makes separating contracts vulnerable to
an upsetting deviation (by a pooling contract). The market-clearing condition in the credit
market implies an inverse relation between loan rates and the amount of loanable funds.
Thus, equilibrium separating contracts will only exist when the amount of loanable funds is
small enough.
On the other hand, equilibrium pooling contracts are easily vulnerable to upsetting de-
viations (by separating contracts) when the size of the loan is small (i.e., when the amount
of loanable funds is small). In fact, borrowers are always rationed with pooling contracts.
Since technologies are linear and subject to a capacity constraint, credit rationing implies
that the profits of the borrowers engaged on bad projects are increasing in the amount of the
loan up to the capacity constraint. Thus, if the size of the loan is too small, a deviating bank
can make higher profits by offering a contract at a slightly higher rate for a substantially
bigger loan.
Since the amount of loanable funds is determined by the wage rate, we can say that
separating contracts prevail when wages are low and pooling contracts prevail when wages
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